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Three Questions (3Qs) of IV&V: 
Q1 - Will the system’s software do what it is supposed to do? 
Q2 - Will the system’s software not do what it is not supposed to do? 
Q3 - Will the system’s software respond as expected under adverse conditions? 
Three Key Parameters: 
• Technical Independence 
• Managerial Independence 
• Financial Independence 
NASA’s IV&V Program 
• NASA's IV&V Program: established in 1993  
• Founded under the NASA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (OSMA) as a direct result of 
recommendations made by the National Research 
Council (NRC) and the Report of the Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
• IV&V is an objective examination of                        
safety and mission critical system and                
software processes and products 
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IV&V Technical Framework 
• Objectives include the verification and validation of: 
– Concept Documentation 
– Requirements 
– Design  
– Implementation 
– Test Documentation 
– Operations and Maintenance 
• Risk-significant adverse condition awareness brings forth 
off-nominal analysis threads aligned with hazards, 
dependability, emergent behavior, security, and testing  
 
IV&V plays a role in the overall risk mitigation strategy applied throughout the lifecycle 
to improve the quality, reliability, safety, and security of critical software systems 
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Adverse Conditions 
• Examining Q2 and Q3 are major 
challenges of FM software 
• An adverse condition is 
considered a subset of an off-
nominal state that prevents a 
return to nominal operations and 
compromises mission success 
unless an effective response to the 
causal fault is employed 
• How a system is architected to 
handle faults and adverse 
conditions is crucial for the 
satisfaction of functional and 
performance requirements  for  
mission success. 
Adverse condition awareness strengthens software assurance 
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Assurance Strategy 
Raising adverse condition awareness identifies areas of significant risk 
 to apply an adaptive, iterative analysis approach for software assurance  
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Capability-Based Assurance 
• Enables software assurance workflow in an adaptive, risk-informed manner 
• Identifies IV&V scope and rigor by prioritizing and framing analysis 
• Infuses agility in order to accommodate change 
• Crosses all lifecycle phases 
• Influences static and dynamic test coverage 
• Communicates findings and assurance conclusions more comprehensively 
• Provides the mapping of critical capabilities to adverse conditions or hazard 
causes that are prevented or mitigated by software controls and verifications 
• Reveals dependencies or vulnerabilities in capabilities that may indicate 
missing requirements, weak design, incomplete implementation, or a need 
for expanded test coverage, either static or dynamic 
The goal of defining capabilities at the mission level is to be able to 
adequately understand and mitigate the riskiest aspects of the mission 
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Hazard Analysis 
• Maintaining the health and safety of a system, or fault management, is a 
cross-cutting capability that is an integral part of assurance 
• A system’s prevention, detection, isolation, response, or tolerance of multiple 
faults and failures maintains mission capabilities despite adverse conditions  
• Assessing hazard causes, controls, mitigations and verifications is part of 
adverse condition awareness that can not be “done and forgotten” at the 
outset of a project, or worse, left to the end during system integration testing 
• Evaluating multiple project artifacts, sources of adverse conditions to which 
the system should be capable of responding, occurs throughout the lifecycle 
• Identifying unforeseen adverse conditions that may impede mission success 
or inhibit safety is an assurance service of great value to a project, ensuring 
that coverage is complete with respect to safety, security, and dependability 
Independent analysis based on solid system understanding and experience with 
similar systems allows analysts to generate adverse conditions to be considered 
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Adverse Condition Database 
• Centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of adverse conditions in a 
cross-project repository with correlated data relevant across NASA missions  
• Incorporates adverse condition awareness into all phases or for all objectives 
of analysis, throughout the development lifecycle, expanding Q3 coverage 
• Provides the ability to map critical capabilities to adverse conditions or 
hazard causes that are prevented or mitigated by software controls 
• Improves analysis by tracking adverse conditions and allowing queries based 
on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key 
characteristics for cross-project fault management knowledge sharing 
• Alerts analysts of vulnerabilities, architectural design weaknesses, and 
unforeseen or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults 
• Identifies risk-significant scenarios that may be selected for dynamic testing 
The Adverse Condition Database promotes assurance at a higher level of rigor 
with the goal of reducing risk and increasing confidence in NASA mission success 
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Value to NASA 
• Collaboration and infusion of results will continue as the Adverse 
Condition Database is deployed to a wider audience and methods 
are enhanced to take advantage of the tool as a dynamic, living 
resource tailored to improve workflow in the ultimate goal of 
reducing risk and increasing confidence in NASA mission success 
• As research progresses, the Adverse Condition Database and 
supporting assurance methodologies seek to: 
̶ Improve capability-based assurance from the provision of              
more comprehensive data 
̶ Provide more rigorous IV&V analysis from identification of                
off-nominal scenarios 
̶ Increase efficiency of analyst workflow and enable broader              
test coverage 
̶ Allow greater focus on FM and project areas of vulnerability                
or significant risk 
̶ Deliver support for reliability and resiliency for critical system      
safety 
 
The complexity of fault management and the importance of effectively providing 
assurance that NASA safety- and mission-critical software will operate reliably, safely, 
 and securely demands rigorous attention to risk-significant adverse conditions 
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